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The insurgency in Thailand's Malay-Muslim dominated southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, has been an on-going issue for decades, and while religion plays a part in it, fundamentally this is a conflict that is based on long-standing political differences. The last six years have seen a dramatic increase in both the number and severity of violent attacks. Since 2004, more than 3,900 Thai security forces, insurgents and civilians have been killed in a region that has a population of only 1.8 million.
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Background
The current situation continues to defy the Thai government's efforts to quell the violence. The growing unrest, coupled with the inability of the Thai government to provide basic security for the region, has led to growing fears that the insurgency will spread to other regions of the country. Developing a successful counterinsurgency strategy by finding a solution to the core issues involved requires a thorough understanding of the background of the region and the origins of the insurgency.
Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, the three provinces that are the predominate focus of the violence, originally were part of the separate Malay sultanate of Patani. The origins of the current separatist movement trace their roots back to the late 1700's when The root causes of the insurgency have not changed during this century and they center on the differences of culture, language and religion. Approximately 80% of the region consists of Malay-Muslims, whose language, Islamic-based religion and cultural identity is tied to that of northern Malaysia. This sets them apart from the Thai speaking, Buddhist-dominated population of Thailand.
Like the northern provinces of Thailand, the three southern provinces have long been among the poorest in the country. However, while substantial strides in combating poverty have been made country-wide with overall poverty falling from 38% in 1990 to 11.3% in 2004, poverty remains at 18% in Narathiwat and 23% in Pattani, more than double the national average. 4 In addition to poverty, maternal mortality is over twice as high in the southern provinces as it is in the rest of the country with 29.8 deaths per 100,000 births in Yala, 30 .8 in Narathiwat and 41.8 in Pattani. 5 With the increased level of violence in the region, the provinces have seen their Human Achievement Index (HAI) 6 Narathiwat provinces and operates from jungle-based guerrilla bands. They appear to receive the majority of their funding from extortion of Thai businesses in the area which varies from a few hundred baht a month for small businesses to thousands of baht for large factories. 16 The PULO is now considered significantly smaller than the BRN, but continues to play a key political role internationally in unofficial talks with representatives from the Thai government. This dialogue has been ongoing since 2005 in various locations in Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. This has spurred fears that JI or Al-Qaeda would use the GMIP to gain inroads into southern Thailand, creating another front in the global jihad. Despite the reported meetings, there is no evidence that links any of these global organizations to the current insurgent activities in the south. 18 The tactics of the various insurgent groups basically focus on four areas:
Assassinations of security forces, government employees, Buddhist civilians and
Muslim community leaders; the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) which are increasingly aimed at transport and communications infrastructure; Arson against both government and private buildings with particular focus on public schools; and smallscale, direct-fire attacks on security forces, often in the form of ambushes. and are among the best trained of the various police units. 25 As a whole, the Royal Thai
Police suffer from a number of issues of which rampant corruption is the most prominent, a fact that is not restricted to the southern provinces. In a nation-wide poll taken in 2000, the police were listed as the most dishonest element of the Thai public sector. 26 The Royal Thai Police within the southern provinces are widely mistrusted by the local population both for their corruption as well as their general abuse of power and this has a significant impact on their effectiveness. Additionally, the Police and the Army have had a history of poor cooperation, due to major inter-agency rivalries and stovepiped intelligence processing. 27 This condition climaxed when Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a former Police Lt Col, transferred the functions of CPM 43 to the Police. Their subsequent mishandling of former Army-managed intelligence assets led to the murder of a significant number of informants. Phran has a very successful recruitment program that targets relatives of those killed by insurgents. Because of the level of commitment that these recruits bring to the organization, the Thahan Phran has been particularly effective at combating the insurgents and has a reputation for fearlessness. 29 But this is a double edged sword as the brutality attributed to the Thahan Phran is likely a result of revenge attacks and the abuses they have committed have been a propaganda goldmine for the insurgency. The security role that the various village militias were established and equipped to perform has largely been a failure. They have been unable to defend the temples, schools, government facilities or the people whom they were formed to protect. And increasingly their weapons are stolen and end up in the hands of the insurgents.
Thai Government Strategies
Key to the Thai government's overall strategy since the early 1900's has been the attempted assimilation of the Malay-Muslims but, with little recognition for their unique culture, religion and language, this has met with failure due to the strong resolve to maintain their unique culture and customs. Throughout the early to mid 1900's, the Thai government attempted to progressively integrate the southern provinces. They gradually replaced the old system of governance in the region which provided for some limited autonomous Malay representation, with one where the officials were appointed from the capital. This policy was in-line with the procedures for the rest of the country.
It was during this time that the government attempted to enforce "Thai" customs, language and legal standards, phasing out Shari'a law and the use of the various dialects in the region. Forced integration and assimilation has remained a key element in the Thai strategy and this overall approach has not appreciatively changed. Because of this, all efforts undertaken by the Thai authorities are viewed with skepticism by the local population. 34 Beginning in the 1960s, the Thai government attempted to register and convert many of the pondoks into private Islamic schools. The stated goal was to ensure that the converted schools provided a mix of the standard Thai curriculum in addition to the religious education previously provided. In reality, by controlling the funding for these private Islamic schools, the Thai government was able to gain considerable political control over the imams as well as the Islamic councils. Unfortunately this served to undermine the credibility and morale authority of these individuals with the Malay Muslim population as well as weaken the religious institutions. 35 During the 1980's, following a major rise in violence in the southern provinces, the Thai government of Prem Tinsulanond 36 made a significant adjustment in strategy.
The government offered amnesty to those that had taken part in the separatist movement and established the SBPAC to enhance consultations with the local population, solve the problem with corruption and reduce the prejudice among the nonlocal officials. The Royal Thai Army was given the lead for ensuring security in the region. Additionally, the government co-opted the Malay-Muslim religious and political elites by providing developmental funds and privileges for their cooperation. This policy was effective at stemming the violence for the next twenty years. recommendations, the goal is to build systems and processes that serve to enhance the legitimacy of the government and to bind the provinces to the Thai Nation as a whole.
Conclusion
Despite periods of reduced violence in the region, the Thai government's counterinsurgency strategies of the past have proven largely ineffective. Since the resurgence in violence, the Thai government has spent over $3.2 billion in the region and doubled the number of security forces in the area to now almost 60,000. interest in taking operations to Bangkok or Phuket. We do not need to be on anyone's terrorist list. Once we are on that list, it is all over" 53 The current insurgency in the south is the most significant threat to the Thai government since the communist insurrection in the 1970's.
, clearly indicates that this is a strategic decision on the part of the insurgents. This is likely one of the reasons for the Thai government's reluctance to accept any offers of direct foreign assistance. Any action or perception that a foreign government, and in particular the United States, is directly involved in counterinsurgency operations in the southern provinces could have the opposite intended affect and widen the conflict zone to heavily populated areas outside the southern provinces, causing significant damage to the critical Thai tourism industry. In other words, if it was perceived that the United States was directly assisting
Thailand in their counterinsurgency efforts as part of the wider global war on terrorism, then the insurgency would not have any reason to limit their actions solely to the southern provinces. It is highly unlikely, given the current, constrained nature of the insurgency, that the Thai government would desire the level of assistance that the United States currently provides to The Philippines in their fight against the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao. 54 With the increase in violence and the inability of the Thai government to effectively provide security to the region, it is critical that a new strategy be developed. The basis for a new, revised strategy has been highlighted above and should be rapidly adopted. With each day that goes by, the increased level of violence, by both the insurgents and the Thai security forces, further alienates the population and reinforces the deep seated animosity between the Thai-Buddhist majority and the Malay-Muslim population. While a solution to the insurgency will be costly, both in terms of time and resources, delaying action will only further the animosity, limit future options and increase the cost. Recent policy shifts, including a historic visit to the southern provinces by the new Malaysian Prime
Minister Najib Razak at the invitation of the Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, 55 offers a glimmer of hope that the government will adopt a new, more effective strategy in attempting to solve the dispute.
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